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Case No. 20110174-SC
INTHE

UTAH SUPREME COURT

State of Utah,
Plaintiff / Petitioner,
vs.

Patrick Robert Ramirez,
Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner State of Utah
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The magistrate found insufficient evidence to bind Ramirez over for trial on
one count of possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and
one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, and
dismissed the charges. The State appealed the dismissal to the court of appeals,
which affirmed the magistrate's ruling. This Court granted the State's timely
petition for a writ of certiorari. This Court has jurisdiction under its certiorari
review authority. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) & (5) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Court granted certiorari review on the following question:
"Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in affirming
the magistrate's refusal to bind Defendant over."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals'
decision for correctness and affords no deference to the court of appeals' legal
conclusions. In re A.T., 2001 UT 82, | 5, 34 P.3d 228. When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence at a preliminary hearing, the appellate court, like the
magistrate, must view the "evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. Clark,
2001 UT 9,110,20 P.3d 300 (citation omitted). A magistrate's bindover decision is
afforded only "limited deference." State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, | 26,137 P.3d 787.
Whether probable cause exists is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See
State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 14 n.2,48 P.3d 872.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum D:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009);
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-2 (West Supp. 2009);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 (West Supp. 2009).
.{

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ramirez was charged with one count of third-degree felony possession or use
of a controlled substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009),
and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, see Utah Code
2
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Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009). Rl-2. After a preliminary hearing, the
magistrate refused to find probable cause to support the information and dismissed
both charges. R36-37. The State timely appealed to the court of appeals. R42-43.
Judge Orme, writing for the majority, affirmed the magistrate's dismissal Judge
Thorne dissented. The court of appeals' decision is reproduced in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On 6 May 2009, Ramirez was in the Washington County Jail on drug-related
charges. R41:5. That day, a jailor overhead Ramirez ask a woman on the telephone
to go to his motel room,"retrieve a glass pipe before the manager could find it," and
take the pipe to police. R41:5-8. Ramirez told the woman that the pipe was clean
and "would clear his name" of his pending drug charges. R41:8. The jailor
arranged for Ramirez to talk on the telephone with a member of the Washington
County Drug Task Force. R41:ll. Ramirez invited the task force to search for the

1

Consistent with the standard of review for a magistrate's bindover decision,
the following facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," and
all "reasonable inferences" are drawn in favor of the prosecution. See State v. Clark,
2001UT9,1J10,120P.3d300.
3
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unused pipe in his motel room, reiterating that the pipe would "clear his name" of
the pending charges.2 R41:12-13,15.
Ramirez stayed on the phone with the officers while they entered the room
with the manager and searched for the pipe. R41:13. The officers found a clear glass
pipe where Ramirez said it would be—on his bed under some covers. Id. The pipe
was "the type commonly used to ingest controlled substances," and "did not appear
to be used." Id.
Over the phone, an officer asked Ramirez "why he had the unused pipe in the
first place." R41:16. Ramirez replied, "I'm going to be honest with you,... I have a
problem." Id. Ramirez added that he had a clean, unused syringe on him when
arrested, because he liked to "ram" or "slam"—meaning inject—his drugs. Id.
When officers asked if they could search the rest of Ramirez's room, he said,
"Yeah, go ahead. There won't be anything there." R41:14. But inside a trash bag
hanging in the kitchen, officers found the corner of a baggie and a short piece of
plastic or "tube" straw. Both the baggie and straw had methamphetamine residue
on them. R41:14,16-20.

2

The record is not illuminating as to why Ramirez thought finding a clean
glass pipe in his living quarters would exonerate him of pending drug charges. See
R41:15.
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No evidence suggested that anyone other than Ramirez occupied the motel
room. R41:20-23. The officers found paperwork and a prescription bottle with
Ramirez's name on it. R41:20, 23. They found nothing in the room identified as
belonging to anyone else. R41:23. On cross-examination, an officer acknowledged
that the manager, who had let them in, could have had prior access to the room. In
response to questioning, the officer also "imagined" that the housekeeping staff also
could have had prior access to the room. R41:22-23.
Magistrate's Ruling
The magistrate refused to bind Ramirez over on both counts. R36-37. The
magistrate found probable cause "to believe that Defendant had dominion and
control over the motel room at some point in time before the officers searched the
room," but opined that no evidence showed that Ramirez "had knowledge that the
drug residue and paraphernalia [found in the trash] were present in the motel room
either when he was personally present in the room or when the officers searched the
room." R37. The magistrate further concluded that "[ejvery reasonable inference
from the evidence/' was that Ramirez "did not know of the presence of the drug
residue and paraphernalia." Id. (emphasis by magistrate). The magistrate reasoned
that "[w]ithout knowledge of the presence of the contraband," he "could not infer
that Defendant intended to exercise control over the contraband," and that
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"[w]ithout evidence of an intent to exercise control, there can be no inference of

<

possession of drug residue or paraphernalia/' Id.
The magistrate based his decision, at least in part, on an inference that if
Ramirez had known of the drug residue and paraphernalia in the trash, he never
would have invited police to search his room. For example, at the end of the
i

preliminary hearing, the magistrate said: "it's a stronger inference [Ramirez] didn't
know the drugs were there, or he wouldn't have sent police officers to that place to
look around." R41:34. In his findings, the magistrate added: "I am well-acquainted
with this Defendant, having recently sentenced him to multiple terms of
incarceration in the Utah State Prison. He purports to be familiar with police

4

investigations and with his rights in those investigations." R37 n.l.
Court of Appeals" Decision
In tne cou.rt of appeals, the State argued that the preliminary hearing evidence
and its reasonable inferences supported probable cause—i.e., a reasonable
i
belief—that the contraband found in the trash belonged to Ramirez, particularly
where he admitted to abusing drugs and possessing drug paraphernalia, and where,
by all indications, he lived alone in the motel room. See State's Opening Br. in Ct.
Apps. at 12-17. The State argued that to the extent one could reasonably infer from
the evidence that the manager or housekeeper might have entered the room and
6
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<

planted the contraband in the trash bag, the far more reasonable inference from the
evidence was that the contraband belonged to Ramirez. See id. at 16-17. The State
contended that under this Court's precedent, the magistrate was required to accept
the latter reasonable inference over all others and bind Ramirez over, so that the
trier of fact could decide which inference was more reasonable. See id. at 10-12,17.
The majority opinion. Writing for the majority, Judge Orme disagreed that
the evidence supported any reasonable inference that the contraband belonged to
Ramirez. Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *1. According to the majority, the "critical
piece missing from the State's presentation was evidence showing the nature and
character of the motel, or of Defendant's room in particular, and the exclusivity of
his control and access." Id. The majority faulted the prosecution for not calling the
manager to testify, adding: "Without such evidence in the record, the State's
contentions about the exclusivity of Defendant's control of and access to the room,
at all points in time when the contraband might have found its way into the garbage
sack, are speculations — albeit plausible ones —rather than inferences logically
drawn from the evidence actually before the magistrate." Id.
The dissent In Judge Thome's view, the preliminary hearing evidence gave
rise to two alternative, but conflicting, reasonable inferences. First, because Ramirez
"gave permission to search the motel room, which others such as the manager and
7
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housekeeping staff may have had access/' one could reasonably infer that Ramirez

<

/'did not know of the presence of the drug residue and paraphernalia." Id. at *2
(Thorne, J., dissenting). But other facts at preliminary hearing gave rise to "an
alternative reasonable inference": that Ramirez "indeed knew of the drug residue
but thought that the residue would not be discovered because he had properly
discarded it prior to leaving his room.7' Id. Relying on this Court's precedent, Judge
Thorne concluded that the conflicting inferences were required to be resolved in
favor of the prosecution. Id. at *2-3 (citing Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 10). Under that

*

precedent, Judge Thorne explained, the bindover standard is "relatively low" and
"intended to leave the principal fact finding of the issues . . . to the jury." Id. at *2.

|

Judge Thorne also disagreed with the majority that "the absence of exclusivity
evidence renders any other inferences speculative." Id. Rather, Judge Thorne
explained, the preliminary hearing evidence provided " a logical basis from which to
deduce that Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled
i
substance and drug paraphernalia." Id. at *3.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court of appeals' majority concluded that the preliminary hearing

*

evidence failed to support a reasonable inference that the contraband found in the
trash sack belonged to Ramirez, because another alternative reasonable inference
8
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|

suggested that someone other than Ramirez had access to his motel room. By
requiring the prosecution to exclude all alternative reasonable explanations or
hypotheses, the court of appeals effectively replaced the relatively low probable
cause standard required at preliminary hearing with the much higher beyond-areasonable-doubt standard required at trial. It also effectively eviscerated the
requirement that the magistrate resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
prosecution.
At the preliminary hearing stage, however, the prosecution need not preclude
all reasonable alternative explanations or hypotheses. The prosecution need only
adduce sufficient evidence that supports a reasonable belief that the defendant
committed the charged offense. In assessing whether the evidence supports such a
belief, the magistrate and reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
prosecution. When faced with competing reasonable inferences, the magistrate
must choose those inferences that reasonably support the prosecution's case. The
task of resolving those conflicts is left to the ultimate trier of fact.
Here, the preliminary hearing evidence supported a reasonable inference that
the contraband found in Ramirez's motel room belonged to him: Ramirez admitted
to being a drug abuser and to possessing paraphernalia for that purpose—the needle
9
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he possessed when arrested and the glass pipe found in his bed. The clean glass

<

pipe found in his bed—where he said it would be—was of the type commonly used
to ingest drugs. Methamphetamine residue was found on a baggie and short tube
straw in a trash bag hanging in the motel room that by all indications only he
occupied. And although the manager and housekeeping may have had access to the
i

room during his absence, that did not negate the reasonable inference that the
contraband in Ramirez's trash sack belonged to him. Presumably, if housekeeping
or the manager had entered the room, the trash sack would have been removed.
In sum, to the extent that one can infer from the evidence that someone else
might have entered the room and planted the contraband in the trash sack, the far

4

more reasonable inference from the evidence is that the contraband belonged to
Ramirez, who admitted to abusing drugs and possessing drug paraphernalia, and
who, by all indications, lived alone in the motel room. The magistrate and court of
appeals' majority were required to accept the latter inference. The court of appeals'
i
majority therefore erred in not binding Ramirez over on both charges.

I

10
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS' MAJORITY ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE MAGISTRATE'S REFUSAL TO BIND OVER
The court of appeals' majority concluded that the preliminary hearing
evidence was not susceptible to any reasonable inference that the contraband found
in the trash bag belonged to Ramirez. The majority based this conclusion on the
State's failure to produce evidence "showing the nature and character of the motel,
or of [Ramirez's] room in particular, and the exclusivity of his control and access."
State v. Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *1. The majority reasoned that without
"such evidence," the State could not show that Ramirez had exclusive control of and
access to his motel room "at all points in time when the contraband might have
found its way into the garbage sack." Id. Thus, the majority concluded, the State's
contention that the evidence supported an inference that Ramirez knew that the
contraband was in his room was mere "speculation," albeit "plausible." Id.
As explained below, the majority's reasoning mistakenly presupposes that the
State is required at the preliminary hearing stage to exclude all reasonable
alternative explanations or hypotheses of a defendant's innocence. As a result, the
majority's opinion effectively increases the relatively low probable-cause standard
of proof required for bindover to the much higher beyond-a-reasonable-doubt

11
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<

standard of proof required for a guilty verdict. It also effectively eviscerates wellestablished precedent requiring a magistrate to resolve all conflicting evidence and
inferences in favor of the prosecution. Id. at*l.
Because the majority misapplies the preliminary hearing standards, it also
mistakenly concludes that the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that
the contraband found in the trash bag belonged to Ramirez. As explained more
fully below, the preliminary hearing evidence supports such an inference. And, as
Judge Thorne wrote, that reasonable inference was not negated by any lack of
evidence on "the nature and character" of the motel and Ramirez's room or on the
"exclusivity" of Ramirez's "control and access" to his room.
A. The prosecution need not preclude all reasonable alternative
explanations or inferences at the preliminary hearing stage.
The threshold standard for obtaining a bindover is well-established: "To bind
a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a preliminary
hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged has
been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'" State v. Clark, 2001UT 9,
Tj 10,20 P.3d 300 (additional internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus,
"to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must. .. produce believable

12
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evidence of all the elements of the crime charged/' Id. at f 15 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
But the quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause
for a bindover is "relatively low" — the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant.
Id. at H 10,16. See also State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,118,137 P.3d 787. Under both
the bindover and arrest standards, the prosecution must only present "'sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that
the defendant committed it/" Virgin* 2006 UT 29, f 20 (quoting Clark, 2001 UT 9, f
16) (emphasis added).
In assessing whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that a
defendant committed each element of the charged offense, the magistrate "must
view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And, "when faced with conflicting
evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence." Id. Rather, the
magistrate "must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Id.
Likewise, when the evidence gives rise to competing reasonable inferences,
the magistrate must choose those inferences that support the prosecution's case. See
id. at f 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two alternative
13
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inferences—one suggesting innocence and the other guilt—viewing evidence in
light most favorable to prosecution, evidence supported probable cause); see also
State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, % 20, 26 P.3d 223 ("Although defendants'
characterizations of the facts may also be plausibly inferred from the evidence there
are clearly factual issues that must be resolved at trial, and the facts do not negate
the reasonable inferences presented by the State"); State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42,45-46
(Utah App. 1995) (conflicts or //uncertainties,/ in preliminary hearing evidence
should be "left for the fact-finder to resolve at trial").
The magistrate must choose the inferences that support the prosecution, even
when the magistrate believes that the opposing inferences appear to be more likely.
Cf. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ff 20-21 (finding prosecution had shown probable cause
despite identifying two plausible alternate inferences); Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 20
(finding probable cause despite competing plausible inferences of innocence and
guilt). So long as the inferences that support the prosecution's case are reasonable,
the magistrate must bind over.
The prosecution, therefore, is not required to exclude all reasonable
alternative explanations or hypotheses of a defendant's innocence at the preliminary
hearing stage. To the contrary, as explained, when the evidence is conflicting, the
magistrate does not resolve those conflicts, but leaves that task to the fact-finder at
14
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trial As Judge Thorne recognized in his dissent: The "bindover standard is
intended to leave the principal fact finding of the issues . . . to the jury/7 Ramirez,
2010 UT App 373U, at *2 (Thorne, J., dissenting).
The court of appeals' majority accurately recited the foregoing precedent. But
it materially departed from it. First, the majority—like the magistrate— refused to
draw those reasonable inferences in support of the prosecution's theory that the
contraband belonged to Ramirez.

This was based on the majority's—and

magistrate's—misapprehension that the prosecution was required at the preliminary
hearing stage to exclude all other reasonable alternative explanations of how the
methamphetamine came to be in Ramirez's trash: "The critical piece missing from
the State's presentation was evidence showing the nature and character of the motel,
or of Defendant's room in particular, and the exclusivity of his control and access!'
Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *1 (emphasis added).
By requiring the prosecution at the preliminary hearing stage to exclude all
possible explanations of Defendant's innocence, the majority in effect adopted the
so-called reasonable alternative hypothesis standard, which is "a more specific
statement of the traditional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"
required at trial. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 799 (Utah 1991). Thus, the court of
appeals' majority effectively replaced the "relatively low" probable cause standard
15
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i

heretofore required at preliminary hearing with the much higher beyond-a-

<

reasonable-doubt standard required at trial. And, in so doing, the majority
effectively converted the magistrate's role as gatekeeper, see Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 12,
into that of the ultimate trier of fact.
In that regard, requiring the prosecution to exclude all reasonable
i

explanations of a defendant's innocence also directly conflicts with this Court's
precedent, which not only prohibits a magistrate from resolving conflicting evidence
against the prosecution, but requires a magistrate to bind over whenever any
reasonable inference from the evidence supports a reasonable belief that the
defendant committed the crime.

4

B. The magistrate and the court of appeals' majority erred in not
drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicting
reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.
The majority opinion also directly conflicts with this Court's precedent
requiring the magistrate to draw all reasonable inferences in support of the
prosecution's case. The majority here not only refused to draw any reasonable
inference that Ramirez possessed the methamphetamine residue found in the trash
sack in a room that only he occupied, but it also drew only those inferences that

*

were adverse to the prosecution's case.
i
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

An inference is a "conclusion reached by considering other facts and
deducing a logical consequence from them." Black's Law Dictionary 793 (8th ed.
2004). Stated otherwise, an inference is "a deduction as to the existence of a fact
which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from
proof of other facts/' State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, f 16,3 P.3d 725. See also State
v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (inference is "logical and reasonable
conclusion of the existence of a fact in a case, not presented by direct evidence as to
the existence of the fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of other facts from
which by a process of logic and reason, based upon common experience, the
existence of the assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of fact"). Speculation,
on the other hand, is "the act or practice of theorizing about matters over which
there is no certain knowledge." Hester, 2000 UT App 159,<f16.
Contrary to the majority's decision, the State's argument that the evidence
supported a reasonable belief that the contraband belonged to Ramirez was not
merely "plausible" speculation, but "a deduction as to the existence of a fact which
human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof" of
those facts presented at the preliminary hearing. Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *2
(Thorne, J., dissenting).

17
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The legal test for determining whether a defendant possesses drugs not found
on his person is "whether there was a sufficient nexus between the defendant and
the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the defendant had the
power and the intent to exercise control over the drugs or paraphernalia/' State v.
Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911. Both the majority and the magistrate
incorrectly assumed that a sufficient nexus could not be shown between Ramirez
and the contraband so long as anyone else might have had access to the room where
the contraband was found. See Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, at *2 (emphasizing
prosecution's failure to adduce evidence "about the exclusivity of Defendant's
control of and access to the room, at all points in time when the contraband might
have found its way into the garbage sack").
But this Court has explained that the nexus inquiry is highly-fact intensive,
and may include consideration of many different factors such as ownership and/or
occupancy of the place where the contraband is found, previous drug use,
incriminating statements or behavior, or the presence of drugs or paraphernalia in a
specific area where the defendant had control. See Layman, 1999 UT 79,114; State v.
Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Utah 1985); State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, \ 32,122 P.3d
639.

18
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The foregoing factors are neither exhaustive nor "legal elements of
constructive possession in any context/' Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 14. Rather, they are
merely helpful considerations in an appropriate fact pattern. See id. at | 15.
Ultimately, the "final legal test is the most generally-worded one: ... whether there
was a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the drugs or paraphernalia to
permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to
exercise control over the drugs or paraphernalia." Layman, 1999 UT 79, *J 15. Thus,
while exclusivity of control and access is certainly an important factor—and may
even conclusively prove constructive possession—its lack does not by itself negate a
factual inference that a defendant constructively possessed contraband.
The preliminary hearing evidence here gave rise to a reasonable belief that
defendant had a sufficient nexus to the contraband to permit such a factual
inference. The uncontroverted evidence before the magistrate was that Ramirez,
who was being held on other drug-related charges, asked the police to go to the
motel room where he had been living to find a "clean glass pipe/' because Ramirez
believed this would exonerate him. R41:8,12-13,15,24. There was no evidence that
anyone but Ramirez lived in or exercised control over his motel room. See R41:2023. The fact that Ramirez initially called a friend to go to his room to get the pipe
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"before the manager could find it" suggests that Ramirez lived alone in the room
and believed that his possessions would still be as he had left them. R41:6.
Officers found the pipe where Ramirez said it would be and in a place "in a
specific area" over which he had "special control," Fox, 709 P.2d at 320: "on his bed
under some covers." R41:13. The pipe was of "the type commonly used to ingest
controlled substances," although it appeared to be unused. R41:13.
Ramirez made incriminating statements to the police. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 320
(discussing importance of "other incriminating evidence"). When asked why he
had the unused pipe "in the first place," he admitted to being a drug user and to
possessing a syringe, because he liked to "ram" or inject his drugs. R41:16.
Ramirez gave the officers permission to search the rest of his room, claiming
that they would not find anything. R41:14, 23. Yet, a thorough search yielded
methamphetamine residue in a baggie and on a short tube straw in a trash bag
hanging in the kitchen. R41:14,16-20. Again, the contraband was found in a place
where only Ramirez lived and exercised control. R41:5-8, 20, 23. Significantly, it
was found in a motel room where Ramirez kept a pipe of the type commonly used
to ingest drugs.
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Taken together, the foregoing evidence and its reasonable inferences support
a reasonable belief that Ramirez owned, and therefore possessed, the drug residue
and short tube straw.
As Judge Thorne recognized, the fact that the manager and housekeeping
might have had access to Ramirez's room does not negate those reasonable
inferences. Rather, that fact at most gives rise to an alternative but conflicting
inference, which, as explained, is for the jury to resolve. But while it is possible that
the manager or housekeeper might have accessed Ramirez's room and deposited the
contraband in the trash sack, the most reasonable inference from the evidence is that
the contraband was Ramirez's. Presumably, if housekeeping had accessed the
room, the trash sack would have been removed. Nothing in the evidence—or
human experience—suggests a reason why someone other than Ramirez would have
taken the trouble to deposit the contraband in a trash sack in a room occupied solely
by Ramirez.
The court of appeals' majority and the magistrate appear to have inferred that
Ramirez did not know of the contraband's presence in his trash sack, because he
consented to the search. R37 n.l; R41:34. That inference, however, is not a
reasonable one. Criminal defendants regularly consent to searches, even though
they know that contraband is present. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 2007 UT App 117, f 5,
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158 P.3d 1134 (defendant consented to search of person, which yielded
paraphernalia); State v. Perez-Llamas, 2006 UT App 428U (defendant consented to
search of tires, which contained drugs); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 14-16, 63
P.3d 650 (defendant consented to search of vehicle, which yielded marijuana pipe).
And, as Judge Thorne recognized, a more reasonable inference is that Ramirez
"indeed knew of the drug residue but thought that the residue would not be
discovered because he had properly discarded it prior to leaving the room/ 7 See
Ramirez, 2010 UT App 373U, *2 (Thorne, J., dissenting).
In any event, the question here is not whether Ramirez knew the contraband
would be discovered when he invited officers to search his room. The question is
whether the evidence and its reasonable inferences support a reasonable belief that
the contraband found in the trash belonged to Ramirez. As explained, the most
reasonable inference from the evidence in this case is that the contraband belonged
to the person with the strongest factual nexus to it—Ramirez. But even assuming
that the evidence gives rise to a reasonable conflicting inference that someone else
placed the contraband in Ramirez's trash, the magistrate was obligated to accept the
inference supporting the prosecution's case and to bind Ramirez over.
The court of appeals thus erred in affirming the magistrate's refusal to bind
over.
22
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of appeals'
decision affirming the magistrate's refusal to bind Ramirez over for trial.
Respectfully submitted September
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

">£<c*x
J^AURA B. DUPAIX

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah- Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Patrick Robert RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20090912-CA.
Dec. 23, 2010.
Fifth District, St. George Department, 091501000;
The Honorable G. Rand Beacham,
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant.
Ryan D. Stout, St. George, for Appellee.
Before Judges MCHUGH, ORME, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
ORME, Judge:
*1 "To bind a defendant over for trial, the State
must show probable cause at a preliminary hearing
by presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that
the crime charged has been committed and that the
defendant has committed it." State v. Clark, 2001
UT 9, t 10, 20 P.3d 300 (alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
While" the quantum of evidence required to support
a finding of probable cause for bindover is
"relatively low," id 1fl[ 10, 16, "to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution must ... produce
believable evidence of all the elements of the crime
charged," id. \ 15 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). To determine whether the evidence
supports a reasonable belief that the defendant committed each element of the charged offense, " 'the

magistrate must view all evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.' " Id
f 10 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
To bind over on possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, the
State must present evidence sufficient to support a
reasonable belief that Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance and
drug paraphernalia, respectively. See Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2010) (possession of
a controlled substance); id § 58-37a-5(l)-(2)
(possession of drug paraphernalia). In this context,
"possession" is defined as "the joint or individual
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining,
belonging, [or] maintaining" of contraband. Id §
58-37-2(1)00In this case, the State failed to present sufficient evidence "to support a reasonable belief that
[Defendant] committed the charged crime," State v.
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, f 17, 137 P.3d 787. Because
Defendant was in jail at the time officers searched
his motel room, the State, as the magistrate concluded, "would have to establish probable cause to
believe that Defendant had constructive possession
of the contraband." Although the magistrate found
"probable cause to believe that Defendant had
dominion and control over the motel room at some
point in time before the officers searched the
room," he nevertheless concluded-and the emphasis
is his, not ours-that "[e]very reasonable inference
from the evidence ... [indicated] that Defendant did
not know of the presence of the drug residue and
paraphernalia."
The critical piece missing from the State's
presentation was evidence showing the nature and
character of the motel, or of Defendant's room in
particular, and the exclusivity of his control and access.™1 The motel manager was not called as a
witness, and when the prosecutor sought to ask one
of the detectives about information he had learned

© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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from the manager-presumably concerning such
matters-Defendant objected and the prosecutor
withdrew the question. Without such evidence in
the record, the State's contentions about the exclusivity of Defendant's control of and access to the
room, at all points in time when the contraband
might have found its way into the garbage sack, are
speculations-albeit plausible ones-rather than inferences logically drawn from the evidence actually
before the magistrate. Cf State v. Layman, 953 P.2d
782, 791 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (stating that, in a case
"[w]here the State fails to present evidence establishing a pivotal fact[,] ... we must take special care
to ensure that our review of the evidence does not
encourage the indulging of 'inference upon inference,' or, worse, the indulging of inference upon
assumption"), affd, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. See
also State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, \ 16, 3 P.3d
725 ("While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a
difference between drawing a reasonable inference
and merely speculating about possibilities."), cert,
denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000); id (defining
"inference" and "speculation").
FN1. Indeed, one of the detectives conceded the likelihood of the manager and
the housekeeping staff having unfettered
access to the room.
*2 Therefore, because the evidence presented
to the magistrate fails to support a reasonable belief
that Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the methamphetamine residue and drug
paraphernalia found in his motel room, we cannot
say that the magistrate erred by refusing to bind
Defendant over.
Affirmed.
I CONCUR: CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, Associate
Presiding Judge.
THORNE, Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the majority's affirmance of the magistrate's decision to not bind
Defendant over on charges of possession of a con-

trolled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia. I do not agree with the majority's determination that because the prosecution failed to
present evidence showing the nature and character
of the motel or of Defendant's lodgings and the exclusivity of his control and access, the facts of this
case fail to support a reasonable belief that Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the
methamphetamine residue and drug paraphernalia
found in his motel room. See supra paras. 4-5.
Here, the facts give rise to two reasonable alternate inferences. One inference from the evidence
would be that because Defendant gave permission
to search the motel room, which others such as the
manager and housekeeping staff may have had access to, Defendant did not know of the presence of
the drug residue and paraphernalia. However, an alternative reasonable inference from other facts,
such as the state of Defendant's motel room,FN1
that nobody had accessed his room without his permission, and that Defendant lived alone in the
room, is that Defendant indeed knew of the drug
residue but thought that the residue would not be
discovered because he had properly discarded it prior to leaving his room.
FN I. The officers found the pipe where
Defendant said it would be on Defendant's
bed under some covers. The officers also
found paperwork and a prescription bottle
with Defendant's name on it. The search
revealed nothing in the motel room belonging to anyone other than Defendant.
When faced with conflicting evidence and inferences, "the magistrate must view all evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and must
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, H 10, 20 P.3d
300 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the evidence required to show probable cause
is relatively low, see id, and the bindover standard
is intended to leave the principal fact finding of the
issues, which the majority identifies as the nature
and character of the motel room and the exclusivity
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of Defendant's control and access, to the jury. See
State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, 1 21, 137 P.3d 787. As
such, I disagree with the majority that the absence
of exclusivity evidence renders any other inferences
speculative. Although sometimes subtle, "there is in
fact a difference between drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating about possibilities."
State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ^ 16, 3 P.3d 725 .

,

An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them. Stated another way, an inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact
which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other
facts. On the other hand, speculation is defined as
the act or practice of theorizing about matters
over which there is no certain knowledge.
*3 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). It is not necessary that there be only one
most likely inference. It is, instead, enough if an inference is reasonably available which supports the
prosecution's case. Cf. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffi! 20-21
(identifying two alternate inferences, an inference
that the defendants may have been unaware the
checks were stolen and an inference that the defendants had an intent to defraud; viewing all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
state; and finding that despite the conflicting alternate inferences the state had shown probable cause).
The evidence in this case provides a logical basis
from which to deduce that Defendant knowingly
and intentionally possessed a controlled substance
and drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, I would reverse the magistrate's decision.

UtahApp.,2010.
State v. Ramirez
Not Reported in P.3d, 2010 WL 5452079 (Utah
App.), 2010 UT App 373
END OF DOCUMENT
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
By

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
i

•

Plaintiff,

vs.

ORDER DENYING BINDOVER
AFTER PRELIMINARY HEARING
Criminal No. 091501000
Judge G. Rand Beacham

PATRICK ROBERT RAMIREZ,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court for preliminary hearing on September 25, 2009. At the
conclusion of the hearing, Defendant's counsel argued that Plaintiff had failed to establish probable
cause to believe that Defendant "possessed" the methamphetamme residue or the drug paraphernalia
found in a motel room in which he had resided and, presumably, would have been residing if he had
not been in jail. Plaintiffs counsel argued that it was reasonable to infer that Defendant had control
over the contraband in his motel room and that Defendant intended to exercise that control. Having
reviewed the cases cited by Defendant's counsel and the statutory definition of "possession," as well
as the evidence presented at the hearing, I find that the evidence fails to establish probable cause to
believe that Defendant intended to exercise control over the drug residue and paraphernalia.
Defendant sent the officers to the motel room to find a "clean pipe" which he thought would
be of advantage to him with respect to other criminal charges. Defendant also gave the officers
permission to search the room after they found the "clean pipe" where Defendant told them it would
be. In the extended search, the officers found the drug residue and paraphernalia. Since Plaintiff
was in jail at the time, Plaintiff would have to establish probable cause to believe that Defendant had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. f.

constructive possession of the contraband.
There is probable cause to believe that Defendant had dominion and control over the motel
room at some point in time before the officers searched the room. There is no evidence, however,
that Defendant had knowledge that the drug residue and paraphernalia were present in the motel
room either when he was personally present in the room or when the officers searched the room.
Every reasonable inference from the evidence—Defendant sent the officers to his motel room to find
a "clean pipe" and consented to their continuing to search after they found the pipe—is that
Defendant did not know of the presence of the drug residue and paraphernalia.' Without knowledge
of the presence of the contraband, the Court could not infer that Defendant intended to exercise
control over the contraband. Without evidence of an intent to exercise control, there can be no
inference of possession of drug residue or paraphernalia.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause to believe
that Defendant committed the crimes charged against him in this case, and orders that the case be
dismissed.
'••

DATED this _3^Tday of September, 2009.

(£> ^^i^^)c£et^
JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM

]

I am well-acquainted with this Defendant, having recently sentenced him to multiple
terms of incarceration in the Utah State Prison. He purports to be familiar with police
investigations and with Digitized
his rights
thoseW.investigations.
by theinHoward
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-1IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
Case No. 091501000 FS

vs.
PATRICK ROBERT RAMIREZ,

)

Defendant.

)

Preliminary hearing
Electronically Recorded on
September 25, .2009

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM
Fifth District Court Judge
APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

Eric R. Gentry
WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTY
178 N. 200 E.
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435)634-5723

For the Defendant:

Rvan D. Stout
150 N. 200 E. #202
St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435)628-4411

Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT
273 Interlochen Ln.
Stansbury Park, UT 84074
Telephone: (435) 590-5575
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(Electronically recorded on September 25, 2009)
THE COURT:

Numbers 5 and 6, Patrick Robert Ramirez.

MR. STOUT:

He's in custody., your Honor, and we do need

to take evidence on No. 5.
Number 5 was dismiss>ed.
THE COURT:
' . M R . STOUT:

,

Number 6 -- or excuse me, No. 6.

I'm not sure why it's still tracking.

I don't, either.
Other than it does make it convenient for

me to ask the Court to waive any pay the state fees that may be
associated with that
THE COURT:

Oh.

MR. STOUT:

Which there shouldn't be because it was

dismissed, but

—

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. STOUT:

—

mtTT-' o A n n m .

Okay.

we'll be asking that in his other cases

as well.
j

Yeah.

1 been dismissed for some time.

That No. 5 case, 09775, has

All right.

Then on the

preliminary hearing case you are taking evidence?
MR. STOUT:

Yes, your Honor. • .

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. GENTRY:
THE COURT:

•

How many witnesses for that?

I have two witnesses, your Honor.
Two witnesses.

All right.

Since

Mr. Ramirez is in custody, we'll take that one first.
me see about the las t preliminary hearing.
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(Court handles other matters)

2

THE COURT:

Then we are going to start with State vs.

3

Patrick Robert Ramirez, case 091501000.

4

with Mr. Stout, his Counsel.

5

forward and be sworn.

6

COURT CLERK:

The defendant is present

Let's have the two witnesses come

Do you swear that the testimony you are

7

about to give in the case now pending before the Court will be

8

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

9

(Witnesses indicated in the affirmative)

10

THE COURT:

Which one is the first witness?

11

MR. GENTRY:

Sergeant Benson, your Honor.

-1

C"\

THE COURT:

1Z

13

All right.

Would you take the stand,

please?

14

TREVOR BENSON

15

having been first duly sworn,

16

testifies as follows:

17

DIRECT EXAMINATION

18

3Y MR. GENTRY:

19

Q.

Can you please state your name?

20

A.

Trevor Benson.

21

Q.

Where are you employed?

22

A.

Washington County Sheriff's Office.

23

Q.

What -- where do you work in the sheriff's office?

24

A.

I am assigned to corrections, booking.

25

Q.

In the booking?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Were you employed in booking on May 6th of 2009?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know Patrick Ramirez?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How do you know him?

A.

Just from dealing with him inside the facility.

Q. . On May 6th, 2009 do you know whether or not he was
incarcerated?
A.

He was.

Q.

I couldn't hear you.

A.

He was.

Q.

Do you recognize Mr. Ramirez in the courtroom today?

A.

I do.

Q.

Where is he seated?

A.

At the defense table, wearing the stripes.

Q.

Do you know if Mr. Ramirez is still incarcerated?

A.

I believe so.

Q.

On May 6th, 2009 were you present when the defendant was

I saw him inside the jail yesterday.

on a telephone from the jail?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall approximately what time of the day that

A.

I think it was the afternoon, but I'm not sure, no.

Q.

Was there something about him being on the telephone

was?
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-6tha t caught your attention?
A.

There was.

Q.

What was that?

A.

He was being a bit loud on the phone, not loud enough

that I was getting on his case for it, but then he went from kind
of loud to putting his hand over the phone and b eing real quiet,

1 andhe was looking up at me as he 1^as doing it, which kind of
raised my suspicion.
Q.

What did you do at that p Dint?

A.

I picked up the telephone receiver that can listen to

the phone he was on to see what he was talking a bout.
Q.

Could you hear his conversation?

A.

I could.

Q.

Was there something about that conversa tion that "

att ract ed your attention or caused you concern?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What specifically did you hear him say that caused you

r.ODQf^rr

A.

9

I heard him tell a female to go down to the motel room

and ret rieve a glass pipe be fore the manager cou Id find it.
Q.

Did he instruct her what to do with the Pips,?

A.

Yes. .

Q.

What did he say?

A.

Ke wanted her to ta ke it to the police.

Q.

Did he say a reasori?
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A.

At that point I didn't hear a reason.

I left and made a

2

phone call to Eric Enter to head off the person that was going to

3

pick up the pipe.

4

Q.

Why Eric Enter?

5

A.

I knew he was working that day, and he's part of the

6
7

drug task force.

1 Q-

8

Okay.

Did you hear in this conversation him tell the

female where his room was?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

What did he say?

11

A.

The Ancestor Inn.

12

Q.

Did he say a specific number?

13

A.

He did, and I had it written down that day, but I don't

14 1 recall the room number.
15

Q.

Okay.

But he did tell you a specific number?

16

A.

Yeah.

He told the female, he didn't tell me.

17

Q.

No, I'm sorry, not

18

A.

Yes .

19

Q.

You overheard him tell the female?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

So did you then have a conversation with Detective

22

Enter?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Did you have another conversation with Mr. Ramirez then?

25 :

A.

I did.

—

I left the booking area to make the phone call
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to Detective Enter because it was very loud.
few people being processed in right then.

There was quite a

So I went up front to

a quiet office where I could pick up the telephone, as well as
log into a computer and listen to more of the phone call that
Mr. Ramirez was still on.
I called Eric, and I told him what was going on.
pulled the phone up, and I could hear him —

I

at that point,

that's when I realized he was trying to get the pipe to the
police.

I didn't know that when I initially called Eric.

Q.

On that -- when you're overhearing the conversation on

the computer, then, did he ever state a reason why he wanted it
to -A.

•
He was telling the female that he thought that the pipe

was clean, and that would clear his name of whatever charges he
was being accused of.
Q.

Did you ever talk to then Mr. Ramirez about this

conversation?
A.

I did.

After that I went to Mr. Ramirez and asked him

if he would like to talk to someone from the task force.

He told

me yes, and I put him on the telephone with Detective Enter.
Q.

Did you have a conversation with Mr. Ramirez about a

search of his -A.

Yes.

I knew --

Q.

—

A.

Detective Enter had asked if I have —

motel room?
if I would have
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-9Mr. Ramirez call because they wanted to search the motel room.
When I told Mr. Ramirez that, he said, "Absolutely.
to him.
Q.-

Let me talk

I'll tell him right where it's at."
Then at that point you had handed the phone to

Mr. Ramirez?
A.

Yes.

Q.

So did you call Detective Enter?

A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

So did you have any more to do with it after that point?

A.

Just stood by while he talked on the phone, and then I

And then handed the phone

—

escorted him back to the cell that he was housed in.
MR. GENTRY:

I don't have any other questions, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

You may cross examine.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. STOUT:
Q.

Did you make a report regarding this?

A.

I didn't.

I thought that I did, and when this subpoena

came up I searched for one and was not able to locate one.

I'm

not sure why.
Q.

Which would explain why I don't have a copy.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

I don't know why there's not one.
When you picked up the phone to hear what you've
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1

testif ied to as Mr. Ramirez, were there other inmates on the

2

phone •—

3

there.

4

A.

other lines or other —

I don't know how it's set up

I assume there's more than one phone.
There are two phones.

They sit just a few feet from

5

each other, and I don't recall if anybody else was on the other

6

phone.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

Uh-huh.

9

Q.

—

10

is there a way to differentiate between the two

different phones?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

When you picked up the listening in line --

You punch a code in for each phone.
To your recollection, do you remember punching in

the code -- the phone for

—

14

A.

Yes.

15 I

Q-

That Mr. B.amirez was using?

16

A.

Yes, and I could see him talking while I was listening

17

to it.

18

MR. STOUT:

I don't have any further questions, your

20

THE COURT:

Anything else?

21

MR. GENTRY:

22

THE COURT:

23

, MR. GENTRY:

19 i Honor.

No further questions.
Okay.

Thank you.

Go ahead and step down.

I call Detective Eric Enter, your Honor.

24

ERIC ENTER

25

having been first duly sworn,
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-11testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. GENTRY:
Q.

Detective/ will you please state your name?'

A.

Eric Enter.

Q.

Where are you employed?

A.

At the Washington County Sheriff's Office assigned to

the Washington County Drug Task Force.
Were you so employed on May 6th of this year?

Q.

All right.

A.

I was.

Q..

On that day did you receive a phone call from Sergeant

Trevor Benson?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Okay.

What -- when you were talking on the phone with

Sergeant Benson, then at some point did he hand the phone to.
somebody else?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Who was that?

A.

It was Patrick Ramirez.

Q.

Did he identify himself as Mr. Ramirez?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

I did.

Q.

Okay.

You had a conversation, then, with Mr. Ramirez?

Do you recall what he told you when he first --

when you first got on the phone?
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A.

When I first talked with him he wanted —

he wanted

2

somebody from the task force —

he kept mentioning Lieutenant •

3

Staheli's name.

4

us. to go in and find a pipe -- an unused pipe that was in his

5

motel room that would help clear his name on another charge that

6

he was currently incarcerated on.

He's the commander of the task force.

7 J

Q.

Did you ask him for consent to search the room?

8

A.

I did.

9

I asked him for consent several times.

first time I wasn't actually on the phone with him.

He wanted

The

I was on the

10

phone with Sergeant Benson, and I asked Sergeant Benson to ask

11

Patrick Ramirez if he would give us consent to search the room. •

12

He told Sergeant Benson yes.

13

handed the phone to Patrick Ramirez, and then thatrs when I

14

started talking to him.

15
16

Q.

At that point Sergeant Benson

Did you have occasion during this conversation to ask

Mr. Ramirez directly for consent?

17

A.

I did, on at least two occasions.

13

Q.

What was his respon.se?

19

A.

He said yes.

He wanted us to go in and get this pipe .

20

to clear his name, and he was concerned that the pipe get to

21

Lieutenant Staheli to prove that he was innocent on some other

22

charges.

23

Q.

How long did you talk to Mr. Ramirez?

24

A.

Probably 15, 20 minutes, at least.

25

Q.

Okay.

During that conversation did he tell you where he
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-13was living?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did he tell you?

A.

He indicated he —

his room was at the Ancestor Inn, and

it was room 224.
Q.

1

A.
Q.

Did you go to that location?
' I did.
Did you keep Mr. Ramirez on the phone as you went to

that location?
A.

Yes.

Patrick Ramirez was on the phone with me the

entire time that —

from the start when I left the office to when

we searched his room.
Q-.

Did you go to Ancestor Inn?

A.

Yes.

We went to room 224.

opened the door for us.

We met with the manager who

Patrick had given consent to me and to

Sergeant Benson up to that point.
1 me where, this pipe would be.

We entered.

He described to

He said it would be on his bed

under some covers.
Q.

Was it there?

A.

It was.

Q.

Describe what you found.

A.

It was a clear glass pipe, the type commonly used to

[ ingest controlled substances, and it did not appear to be used.
|

Q.

Did you inform Mr. Ramirez that you had found the pipe?

A.

Yes, I did.
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-14Q.

Okay.

Did you ever indicate to him an intention to

continue to search his room?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What was his response to that?

A.

I told -- I asked him if we could search the rest of the

room and he said, "Yeah, go ahead.

There won't be anything

there."
Q.

Did you continue to search?

A.

Yes.

Other detectives that were in the room as well,

Detective Miles and Detective Mitchell, both continued to search.
Q.

Was anything else found suspicious?

A.

Yes.

in a trash —

Detective Miles located a corner of a plastic bag
or a trash bag that was hanging on something from

the kitchen, and he went through the trash and found this corner
of a baggie.

It appeared to have some residue on it.

Q.

Okay.

Anything else found?

A.

There was a plastic -- a short piece of plastic straw

commonly referred to as a tube straw, and that was in the same
area, I believe.
Q.

Did Mr. Ramirez ever speak to someone else on the phone

while you were there?
A.

Yes.

Mr. Ramirez is familiar with Detective Mitchell,

and he overheard —

he heard him in the background talking and he

asked if that was Detective Mitchell.

I told him it was, and he

asked that he might be able to talk to him.
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Q.

Okay.

2

A.

Yes, he did.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

A lot of. it, yes.

5

Q.

How were you able to overhear that?

6

A.

I believe Detective Mitchell had the volume turned up

Did he talk to Detective Mitchell?

Could you overhear that conversation?

7

or the speaker phone portion activated so I could hear it coming

8

from the phone.

9
10
11

Q.

All right.

What was the substance of that conversation

that you heard?
A.

He proceeded to tell Detective Mitchell the same

12

thing that he was telling me, that he wanted the pipe turned

13

in to prove his innocence on that —

14

incarcerated on.

15

I can just refresh my memory real quick.

16

Then he —

the same case that he was

Detective Mitchell asked him -- if
Okay.

He explained to Detective Mitchell the circumstances

17

of his arrest that he was incarcerated on, told him that the

18

gentleman that he was with had purchased two pipes and given one •

19

to him.

20

other gentleman -- was pulled over, from what I understand the

21

driver handed Patrick the used pipe, and he stuck it underneath

22

his seat.. He was subsequently charged with that pipe, but he

23

wanted the clean pipe that was actually his given to -- into

24

evidence to prove his innocence in that case.

25

Q.

When the driver of the vehicle that he was in —

All right.

the

While -you overheard the conversation between
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-16Mr. Ramirez and Detective Mitchell, did the defendant say
anything regarding his own drug use?
A.

Yes.

Detective Mitchell asked him why he had the unused

pipe in the first place.
have it?
Mike.

I could hear Mr. Ramirez say, "Why do I

Why do I have it?

I'm going to be honest with you,

I have a problem."

Q.

Okay.

Did he say anything else?

A.

He went on to say that he had a rig, which is a

street term for syringe, and he said that it was clean and
unused, but he did admit that he -- he -- I heard him say, "ram
it."

Detective Mitchell and I hadn't heard that term, so he

clarified with him what ramming it meant, and asked him if he
meant slamming it, which is injecting it.

Mr. Ramirez indicated

that yes, he slammed it.
Q.

Did you find a hypodermic needle —

A.

It wasn't in the room.

It was —

was with him when he was arrested, I think.

or a syringe?

he indicated that it
We didn't have --

we don't have a syringe that was booked into evidence, no*
Q.

Okay.

So the items that were taken into evidence, do

you know if a field test was done on any of those items?
A.

Yes.

There's a report here in the file.

It shows

that Detective Mitchell, who is FIDO certified, which is a
field investigator —

it's a drug kit, a test kit.

The report

indicates that he tested item MMl, which is the baggie with the
suspected residue, and MM3, which is the tube straw.
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-17Q,

You said you had some paperwork related to that?

A.

Yes.

There is a field drug test report, and a FIDO

controlled substance note sheet.
Q.

Explain those papers, then.

So when you do a field

test, are these papers filled out?
A.

Yes, every time.

Q.

Is there a case number associated with those papers?

A.

Yes, there is.

Q.

Is the case number the same case that we've been

discussing here today?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

All right.

Describe, then, a FIDO test and how it

works.
A.

The -- well, describe how he might test the baggie.

Each of us has our own kit, and once we're certified we're given
a kit by the State' of Utah Forensics Lab.
whatever item we're testing.

A sample is taken from

There's a testing dish with several

different testing cups, I guess you could say.

One of them is

left blank.

...

One of them is a known positive test substance is
put into that one, and that's included in every kit.
substance that the forensics lab supplies that —

It's a

it tests the

chemicals that we're using to make sure that they're working
properly.

Then a sample from the item that we're testing is put

in a separate cup.
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The chemical is put in the blank to make sure that the

Z | chemical itself is not contaminated.

No colors were indicated on

3

that.

4

you look for the positive, which is blue.

5

put on the test sample itself.

6

Q.

On the known substance, the chemical is put into that, and
Then the chemical is

So to the best of your knowledge, was this particular

7 I test you've just described done on that —

on item MM1?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Who performed that test?

10

A.

Detective Mike Mitchell.

11

Q.

So is that document you referred to, does that contain

12
13

the steps on how to do the test?
A.

How does that work?

It's -- the field drug test report shows the results,

14

certification, and is checked that he has successfully completed

15

the training and is certified.

16

and also certifies that he followed the proper testing procedure

It has his certification number

17 I in this case.
18 i

Q.

Is there a result ^iven on those tests?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

What does it say?

21

A.

It's indicated that it presentively contains

22
23
24
25

methamphetamine.
MR. GENTRY:

Your Honor, I think I'd like to have those

marked, actually.
THE COURT:

Okay.
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-19- Two separate?

COURT CLERK
(Mr

Gentry confers with court clerk)

MR. GENTRY:
THE COURT:
MR. GENTRY:

On those —

Do you need this?
If I could just have them.

BY MR. GENTRY:

Q#

I'm sorry.

On those documents, do you see the case

1 number associated with this case, then?

A.

Yes

Q.

All right.

Is there a signature from Detective Mike

Mitchell on those?
A.

Yes

On field drug test report there is Mike Mitchell's

! signature, which I'm familiar with.
MR. GENTRY:

Your Honor, I would ask that it be admitted

into evi dence.
THE COURT:

Any objection to those twc>?

MR. STOUT:

Not for today's purposes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Those exhibits are received.

(Exhibit Nos, 1 and 2 received into evidence)
BY MR. GENTRY:

Q.

On the documents that we just admitted

into evi dence, I noticed MM1 tested.

Was there anything else

tested?
A.
! it's

Yes

I don't have them in front of me

I believe

—
MR. GENTRY:

Can I —

I'm sorry, your Honor.

I should

have ask ed those questions --
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-20THE WITNESS:

- - it's MM3, which is the -- MM3 is the

plastic straw.
Q

*

BY MR

GENTRY:

Okay.

Both of these items were items --

were they located, then, in the hotel room that
A.

Yes.

Q.

-- you were given consent to search?

A.

Yes.

—

They were both located in --• the evidence sheet

indicates that they were both located in a clear pi astic baggie
hanging off of the stove
Q.

To the> best of /our knowledge\, was anyone else Living in

that hotel room?

Did you meet anyone?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you know who was registered to that hotel room?

A.

I remember one of the other detectives meeting with

the manager, and -- who indicated the room was --. had been rented
by -MR. STOUT:

Your Honor, I'm going to object to what the

manager may have said.
MR. GENTRY:
THE COURT:
Q.

And that's fine.

I understand.

That would be hearsay.

BY MR. GENTRY:

Okay.

But as you were -searching —

the

entire team was searching, did anyone come in or out of that
hotel room?
A.

No.

We did locate some paperwork that did have Patrick

Ramirez's name on it and photographed those.
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-21Q.

Okay.

Inside the hotel room?

A.

Inside the hotel room.
MR. GENTRY:

I don't have any other questions, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

You may cross examine.

MR. STOUT:

Thank you.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. STOUT:
Q.

When you initially spoke with Mr. Ramirez —

again, this

was by telephone, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that's because he was incarcerated in Purgatory

Correctional Facility?
A.

Correct.

Q.

He wasn't able -- he wasn't being released, correct?

A.

No.

Q.

He had been or was either booked in or in the process of

being booked in, correct?
A.

He -- it's my understanding he was already booked in.

Q.

When you initially spoke to him, he indicated that he

wanted you to go to this hotel room to retrieve a pipe, correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Initially did he indicate to you that he wanted you to

search the room or just to get the pipe?
A.

He mostly just wanted us to go get the pipe.

But like I
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-22said, I asked him several times —

clarified that it was okay if

we checked the rest of the room and searched it.
Q.

But initially his request was just go get the pipe?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.

But later on, as you've testified and just

clarifie d, you asked him for permission to search, correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay.

Before you asked for permission to search, had

you advi sed him of his Miranda rights?
A.

No,- I did not.

Q.

Before -- was it you that asked him questions about,

"Why do you have a pipe," or was that the other
A.

It was the other detective.

Q.

The other detective.

—

Before he asked those questions,

did he a dvise him of Miranda rights?

!

'•

A.

No.

Q.

You would agree he was in custody at the time, correct?

A.

Yes.

Q .

Again, you met -- you personally met with the manager of

this hot el?
;

A.

Yes.

Q-

Motel.

A.

The manager would, of course, yes.

Q.

Okay.

So he had access to that room, correct?

This room —

was the door to the exterior or

; interior of this motel?
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How do you mean?

Q.

Well, to get inside the room. . Do you know what I mean?

A.

It —

both, I guess.

It's in a walkway, a covered

walkway, but it's not inside the building, no.

It's

Q.

To your knowledge, the door wasn't open.

A.

It was not open.

Q.

You couldn't open it without a key?

A.

What —

—

You

—

I'm sorry?

Q. . It couldn't be opened without a key?
A.

No.

Q.

To the best of your knowledge, other individuals

had access

to that room, including maid staff and -- or

housecleaning, I should say.
A.

I would imagine so.

Q.

You indicated you found some paperwork that belonged to

Mr. Ramirez.

You didn't find any other belongings to somebody

that indicated anything else belonged to other individuals in
that room?
A.

No.

name on it.

They were the only two items that we found with a
One was a piece of paper, and one was a prescription

bottle with Mr. Ramirez's name on it.
Q.

He was pretty clear to you that he didn't mind you

searching the room because, to his knowledge, based on what
he told you, there wouldn't be anything there, right?
A.

That's what he claimed, yes.
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Q.

Okay.

Would it be safe to assume in your opinion that

2

he wouldn't give you that consent if he knew there was something

3

in there that would get him in trouble?

4
5
6

A.

A reasonable person probably wouldn't —

I can't say —
Q.

7 j room.

Okay.

I don't know.

speak on his behalf.
But he wasn't telling you, ''There's drugs in this

Go find my drugs"?

8

A.

Right. .

9

Q.

He-was telling you, u Go find this pipe that doesn't have

10 . anything in it," correct?
11

A.

Correct.

12

Q.

Did he say anything after you indicated you found

13

controlled substances?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Or had you already discontinued the phone --

16

A.

We didn't disclose to him that we had found anything

17
18
19
20

other than the pipe that he wanted us to retrieve.
Q.

And knowing Mr. Ramirez, I imagine he was pretty excited

that you found the pipe?
A.

Yes.

He at several times wanted to make sure that I got

21

that put into evidence to clear his name, and that I wouldn't

22

screw him, his words.

23

Q.

Okay.

These are one of those dumb lawyer questions, but

24

from where Mr. Ramirez was in jail, he couldn't access this hotel

25

room, correct?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-251

A.

Not when I was on the phone with him, no.

2

Q.

Because he didn't have a key to the hotel?

3

A.

I don't know if he had a key.

4

It would have been put in

his property, so he wouldn't have it on his person, no.

5

Q.

And obviously he couldn't get out of the jail?

6

A.

Correct.

7
8
9

MR. STOUT:
Q.

If I can have just a quick moment.

BY MR. STOUT:

Did Mr. Ramirez make any statements to

you that would show that he had knowledge of the controlled

10

substances or the paraphernalia that you found, other than his

11

clean pipe?

12

A.

No, I did not question him about what we had found.

13

Q.

You didn't question —

14

but he had -- he didn't say

anything, either.

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

He didn't give you any --

17

A.

No.

18

The only comment he made was that there wouldn't be

anything in the room.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Except for the clean pipe.

21

Q.

-- it's fair to assume that he didn't think there was

22

So based on that

'
—

anything in the room to get him in trouble?

23

A.

That's what he indicated to me, yes.

24

Q.

That's what he told you?

25

A.

Yes.
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Q.

He didn't make any incriminating statements about

2 ; anything illegal in that —
3

A.

MR. STOUT:

—

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

6

MR. GENTRY:

7

THE COURT:

that you found.

No further questions.

Anything else?

No, ' your Honor.
Thank you.

You may step down.

Any other

state witness?

9

MR. GENTRY:

No, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

11

MR. STOUT:

No evidence, your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

13

•

No.

4

8

•

Any defense evidence?

Any argument on the evidence anc

these two charges?

14

MR. GENTRY:

Yes, your Honor, just very quickly.

15

think the evidence is pretty clear.

16

defendant's hotel room at his request.

17

his request.

18

incriminating evidence, part of which he instructed them to

19

find.

20

methamphetamine.

21

I

The officers went to the
He -- they went in at

They searched with his consent.

They found

The items 'were tested -- field tested and positive for
.

Just anticipating what Counsel may argue, the defendant

22

certainly wasn't there at the time, so it isn't the traditional

23

finding in a pocket or on a person's person kind of possession,

24

but possession, according to the code, means joint of individual

25

ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging,
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-27maintaining.

It's a very broad definition.

Items in the hotel room, the only evidence before the
Court is that they were in the defendant's possession, or the
inference is they were in his possession at one point when he
was in that hotel room.
He knew where the pipe was.
where he said.
room —

It was located exactly

The inference is that everything in that hotel

the rest of the paraphernalia in that hotel room,

including the methamphetamine, also belonged to him.
Just because he wasn't in physical possession of it at •
the time that the officers went there because he was in jail
doesn't mean that it wasn't his stuff, his paraphernalia and his
methamphetamine.
So your Honor, the State would argue that he was -he's guilty of use or possession of that, according to definition
of possession under the statute.
possession.

It doesn't require physical

It only requires that there be some connection to

the defendant.

He maintained it.

It belonged to him.

He had

ownership of it, something along those lines.
Also in the definition it says that you can find the
possession if the controlled substance is found in a place or
under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability
and the intent to exercise dominion or control over it.

I think

in this case those circumstances are present, would ask the Court .
to bind the defendant over.
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MR. STOUT:

Okay .

Mr. Stout?

Your Honor, the statute's a ttempting to

codify what I believe is pretty clear from the case law.

My

first <comment is that this is the statement that I have t o ma ke
to all my cli ents all the time, that they're not charged dlth
ownership, they're charged with possession.
It's obviously a constructive possession case, and
the case law in Utah is pretty clear that in order, as a matter
of law, to have constructive possession there needs to be a
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the item to permit a
factual inference of two things.

One, the defendant had the

power to exercise control over the item, and No. 2, intent.
It's a highly fact specific area, constructive
possession, and there's two cases that I believe are on point.
The first —
case.

the one I'm reading from -- it's actually a juvenile

The cite is 198 P.3d 1007, the M.B. case is what it says.

It explains again that, "Knowledge and ability to possess do not
equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use
of that."

Some of the things that -- and again, it points out

that it's a highly fact sensitive determination.
The specific factors that the Court points to is
whether there was incriminating statements made by the defendant,
which in this case there weren't, at least on the controlled
substances.
was clean.

He's obviously claimed ownership of the pipe that
So I guess the Court could find an inference for the
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-29paraphernalia, but there wasn't any controlled substance
(inaudible).
Another issue is it points to suspicious or
incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of
defendant to location of the drugs, drugs in plain view and drugs
on defendant's person.

The Court refers to a case by the name of

Salas, which indicates that —

again, speaking of constructive

possession that speaking of ownership vehicle indicating that
where the defendant owned the vehicle, but because others had
access to the vehicle, that that was not sufficient to blame the
owner of the vehicle for what was found inside of it.
Additionally, the Court pointed out in that case, in
the Salas case, the defendant's spontaneous statements and
actions indicated he had not previously known about the drugs.
My argument in this case, your Honor, is that this is a similar
case that there wasn't any statements or actions from my client
that would indicate that he knew there were drugs there.

I don't

think even Mr. Ramirez is going to tell the officers, "Go to this
motel room where there are drugs and charge me with them."
Obviously he was -- his intent was exactly the
opposite as was stated, and that he didn't make any incriminating
statements or have any knowledge that's been taken into evidence
today that he knew those items were there.
There is some other case law that goes more to the
State's favor —

State vs. Fox.

It's a 1985 case.

The cite for
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that is 709 P.2d 316.

I'll let the Court take a look at that if

2 | that's important for the Court to look at.

Again, it's highly

3

fact sensitive where there needs to be the nexus.

4

be nexus between the intent and the ability to possess.

5
6

There has to

In this case, your Honor, my client was locked in jail
and had no ability to possess those.

There's not been evidence

7 I today to even indicate that that - was his room.

Now obviously

8

they went purportedly where he said to go and found a clean item

9

that he said was his, but there's nothing tying intent or

10

physical ability of Mr. Ramirez, especially at the time they

11

found this, to the items that were illegal that they found.

12

So I would ask the Court to dismiss as a matter of law

13

Count I, the possession of a controlled substance, because they

14

simply don't have an essential element of that, which is

15

possession, constructive or otherwise.

16

THE COURT:

What about Count II?

17

MR. STOUT:

Count II, your Honor, a clean pipe, I mean

18

we can.always make the argument that it's -- unless there's

19

something to make it paraphernalia, it needs -- it's just a glass

20

pipe.

21

that had been converted.

22

buy in a tobacco shop.

23

You can purchase those.

We didn't hear it was something

It was just a glass pipe that you could

Obviously there were incriminating items found nearby,

24

at least in the same room, but again, I don't think there's

25

anything tying that to my> client.

To the pipe, yes.

I would
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-31I'll just leave that to the Court.
THE COURT:
MR. GENTRY:

Okay.

Mr. Gentry?

Your Honor, just a couple of things.

of.all, there is evidence that it's his room.
said it was his room.
The item inside —

First

First of all, he

He brought the officers there himself.

the pipe —

is located right where he said it

would be, and there were other items located in the room with his
name on it.

So I think there is a very strong evidence --

there's very strong evidence there that this is his room.
the manager let t h e m — let him in —

Plus

let the officers into that

room when they expressed a desire to visit Mr. Ramirez's room.
So I think the only evidence before the Court is that this is his
room.
Also, your Honor, I think -- I guess if you take
Counsel's argument to its extreme, any time an officer pulls
someone out of a car and puts them in handcuffs he no longer has
power to possess anything in that vehicle, so anything they find
in that vehicle can't be chargeable to that person because they
no longer have power to exercise control over that.
I think that's a too narrow view of what it means to
possess something, according to the statute, according to the
definition of possession.
moment of time.

You can't look at it just on that one

The fact is, he possessed these items.

Just

because they're not on his physical person when he's at the jail
doesn't mean he hasn't —

doesn't possess them according to the
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Again, possession or use means the joint or individual

ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, or
maintaining.

It's a very broad definition.

With regard to intent, your Honor, there are
incriminating statements.

His whole statement that he wanted him

to go get the clean pipe to prove that he was clean, that's an
incriminating statement.
paraphernalia.

That's para —

that's drug

He's expressing his own --

THE COURT:
MR. GENTRY:
THE COURT:
MR. GENTRY:

Are you sure?
What's that?
A clean pipe is drug paraphernalia?
Well, I mean according to the officers,

it was a pipe to ingest some —

I think it's incriminating as to

his state of mind, particularly when you combine with his other
statements that he had a problem, that he preferred to slam his
drugs, which the officer meant to inject it.

Those are

incriminating statements that he had intent, at least intent
to use drugs.
THE COURT:

Well, I think the closest argument you've

got there is that according to the testimony, Mr. Ramirez wanted
this pipe to be found and turned in to demonstrate that he did
not have a connection with drugs, which would imply that this
pipe might otherwise be thought to have connection to drugs.

But

I don't know that just the fact that there's a clean pipe means
that it's a drug pipe any more than it means it's a bubble pipe
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-33or a tobacco pipe.
MR. GENTRY:

Well, that could be the case, your Honor.

But I think taken on a whole, he calls the drug task force to
tell them to go look for this pipe that was clean to prove that
he's innocent of drug use.

They go to the room.

paraphernalia indicative of drug use.

They find other

You combine that with his

statement that he had a problem, he wanted to be hon —
I have a pipe?

"Why did

Well, to be honest, I have a problem," and that

he preferred -- they would also find a rig —
that he preferred to slam it.

the syringe —

and

I think when you take that all

together, it shows that he does have intent to possess drugs, in
my mind.
THE COURT:

True.

That may go that far.

I don't know

what it says about the pipe, though, the use of the pipe itself.
But go ahead.

I understand what your theory is.

get to knowledge and ability —
ability.

But how do we

or get past simple knowledge and

We don't have evidence that Mr. Ramirez knew the drugs

were there, the baggie with the residue.
MR. GENTRY:

No.

Well, your Honor, I think -- what

I think the inferences are in this case that this is his room,
there is no evidence anybody else has been in the room.

I think

we can infer that he would know what was in his room.
THE COURT:
inference.

Well, I guess.

I mean that's a general

We can infer I know what's in my basement.

It

doesn't make it true, but we can infer that I know what's in my
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In this circumstance, I think it's a stronger inference
he didn't know the drugs were there, or he wouldn't have sent
police officers to that place to look around.
talking about which is the strongest inference.

But we're not
I understand

that, but I don't think that's a very strong inference that he
knew the drugs were there; therefore, he sent police officers to
go look for something else and gave them permission to search the
rest of the room.

That doesn't sound like a person who knew that

the drugs were there.
MR. GENTRY:
did this or

Your Honor, I don't pretend to know why he

—

THE COURT:

Well

MR. GENTRY:

—

—
what's going on in his head.

I don't

pretend to know any of that, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. GENTRY:

It's a very strange circumstance, I admit.

THE COURT:

Well, to some degree you do have to at least

show me some intent, something going on in Mr. Ramirez's head,
some evidence of what was going on there.
MR. GENTRY:

Well, I think I have to show intent to

possess, your Honor -- intent to possess.

I think his only

statements -THE COURT:

Right, and how is your evidence of intent

Mr. Ramirez's intent to possess those drugs -- that residue in
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-35that baggie -- any stronger than it would be against the motel
manager who had equal access to the room?
MR. GENTRY:

I think his own statements, he's admission

he had a problem, the fact that he went there for the
THE COURT:
was, though.

—

He didn't really even say what his problem

I mean again, that's something that has. to be

inferred from the context
MR. GENTRY:
THE COURT:

That's true.
We're getting inferences piled on

inferences, and I'm just not sure they really string out that
well..

That's the problem.

I mean I have to read the evidence

all in the light most favorable to the State's case.

I also

have to determine whether this is an improvident prosecution
(inaudible) to the appellate court that wrote it.
MR. GENTRY:
Honor.

Well, the evidence is what it is, your

I -THE COURT:

Yeah.

So you say possession by Mr. Ramirez

is shown by his ability to control, at least he claimed it was
his room, he told them what was in the room and -where to find
it.

He had access to the room.

Clearly it was his room so he

could -MR. GENTRY:
THE COURT:

Certainly.
—

at least possess it at some point.

Weil,

what do you say shows his intent to possess the drug residue in
that baggie?

Just that it was in the room?
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MR. GENTRY:

I don't have any more than that, your

2

Honor.

I mean I think you can infer that he has intent to

3

possess what's in his own room as much as you can infer that

4

anybody has an intent to possess what's in their room.

5
6

THE COURT:

Well, then you would have to infer the

intent to possess the bed and the t.v. and take them with him

7 ! when he checked out

—

8

MR. GENTRY:

Weil

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. GENTRY:

11

THE COURT:

—

—

because they're in the room, too.

Okay.
I mean again —

and which is the strongest

12

inference is not necessarily part of this decision, but I have to

13

pay at least some attention to how

14

MR. GENTRY:

15

THE COURT:

16

—

Except your Honor, that -- I mean that -—

the likelihood (inaudible) this evidence

could stack up.

17

MR. GENTRY:

Except I mean a bed and a t.v. belongs in

18

the room.

19.

don't typically go into a motel room and find methamphetamine

20

on —

21
22

Methamphetamine does not belong in the room, and you

hanging on a garbage bag on the door, so
THE COURT:

I don't —

—

I'm making Mr.. Stout's arguments

for him, but I don't know that --

23

MR. STOUT:

You're doing (inaudible).

24

THE COURT:

I don't know that the law says

25

methamphetamine is intended to be found in the room or any place
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It's intended not to be found anywhere because it's

illegal.

It's not the same.

The intent to possess and control a

particular item is what we're looking for here.

The inferences

upon inferences that we have to get to to find a string to
connect that to Mr. Ramirez is kind of thin.
that you haven't given today, evidence —

Is there evidence

I guess other officers

could be called who are involved.
MR. GENTRY:

Detective Mitchell, who couldn't be here

today, would have basically said what you heard today.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

All right.

Mr. Stout, anything else?

MR. STOUT:

Your Honor, I would add briefly that again,

it's the nexus, the finding a pipe and then him admitting that he
has a problem.

I (inaudible) don't -- you know, that's not

illegal yet, but -THE COURT:

Well, there was a context, though.

Of

course, they were talking about, "Why did you want a pipe?"
He said, "I have a problem," and they were -- it was the drug
task force he was talking to.
MR. STOUT:

There's sort of the context --

There are some, and I —

your Honor, with your previous statements.
stretch.

I think it is a

Him saying that he likes to slam it versus —

finding a pipe, those are —
slam.

I mean I agree,

and

you know, you don't use a pipe to

You use needles, so with that, your Honor, again, I

think —

one other thing —

one other argument is that based on

the conversation with Mr. Ramirez, they found the pipe where he
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1

said it would be.

2

recollection, that he was actually there, just that he knew where

3

that pipe was.

4

doesn't put him in that room.

5

There hasn't been any statements, to my

They found the pipe where he said it was.

That

I can tell you where my wife's parents keep their

6

lawnmower in Iowa, but I've never been there.

7

to go look for something where I said, "Go find this," they'll

8

find it.

9
10

So if someone were

That doesn't put me there.
THE COURT:

But Mr. Ramirez saying the purpose for which

he wanted them to find it connected to him.

11

MR. STOUT:

The pipe.

12

THE COURT:

Yeah, the pipe.

13

MR. STOUT:

The clean pipe, yes.

1 /!
_L -i

THE COURT:

Yeah.

15

MR. STOUT:

Again, they could —

16

someone put it there.

17

besides my client.

he —

for all we know,

That's a stretch, too, someone else

18

THE COURT:

Yeah.

19

MR. STOUT:

We know other people had access to the room.

20

Obviously the manager did.

21

THE COURT:

Yeah.

22

MR. STOUT:

That's all I wish to add on that.

23

THE COURT:

All right.

Well, this is one of the

24

thinnest cases for a probable cause finding I've seen for awhile,

25

and you know, the evidence we have to take what evidence there
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The finding of a baggie and a tube straw with residue

testing positive for methamphetamine, according to the field
tests done, is sufficient to raise an inference that certainly
that those things were in the room is sufficient evidence to more
than infer that the room was that of Mr. Ramirez, meaning that he
was the responsible person.

He had the right to occupy the room.

His description of where to find another item in the room was -at least raises an inference that he had been there and knew
where things were.

It may not be the best inference or the only

one, but at least does raise an inference.
Whether he had the intent to exercise control or
possession or ownership of the baggie and the tube straw requires
one of the slimmest inferences I can imagine, and that is that
baggies with methamphetamine residue and tube straw are not
normally supplied with motels, and so that distinguishes them
from the bed and the t.v., and puts them more in the category of
things that a tenant of a motel room either brings with him and
leaves there or discovers in the room and leaves there, but it's
not the kind of thing that is provided to tenants of rooms.
I don't know.

I really have a hard time stretching the

evidence to the point of possession by Mr. Ramirez.
where did I —
Mr. Stout?

oh.

Let's see,

What were those cases you were talking about,

What were the names of them?

There was a juvenile

case.
MR. STOUT:

The juvenile case is —

and the reason I
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didn't say the name is because I'm going to embarrass myself.

2

State exrel, e-x-r-e-1, M.B.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MR. STOUT:

The cite i s — well, there's two cites.

5

The Utah Court of Appeals, 2008 UT at 433, or 198 P.3d 1007.

6

THE COURT:

7 ! referred me to?

Okay.

Was that the only one you had

I thought. I wrote down

—

8

MR. STOUT:

I referred you to two others, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

MR. STOUT:

The one that I mentioned in all fairness,

11

as I believe it's my duty, it's a little more favorable to the

12

State.

It's State vs. Fox.

13

• THE COURT:

14

MR. STOUT:

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Oh, the Fox case.
It's 709 P.2d 316, Utah 1985.

a Salas case, S-a-1-a-s.
THE COURT:

Then there's

State vs. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386.

Now both of those should have been referred

to in the 2008 case.
MR. STOUT:
(inaudible).

And that's correct.

That's correct.

THE COURT:

I'm just looking at the

They are.

I'm going to read that 2008 case first.

I want to see what the current state of thinking is in the

22 J appellate courts about inferences of possession.

So I'll need

23

to take a look at that.

24

I'll have to just do it and get back.to both Counsel on that.

25

If there's time today, great, and if not

I think I'd like to conclude the hearing and give back
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the exhibits at this point, but I want to take a look at that one

2

issue first.

3

Okay.

MR. STOUT:

That's all for today on that.
Your Honor, Mr. Ramirez has asked me to

4

again ask the Court to waive any pay the state fees that he's

5

incurring.

6

other different cases.

He's a state inmate being housed here between all his
I'd ask the Court for every case they can

7 I to waive the pay the state fees.
'8
9

THE COURT:

So —

11

waived.

13

Asking Mr. Ramirez to pay would be

like asking me to dance ballet.

10

12

Yeah.

seriously.

It's just not going to happen.

So I will order that his pay the state fees are

MR. STOUT:

Retroactively for everything, is that

because I think as of now his bill is about $6,000.

—

Thank you.

14

THE COURT:

Yeah.

15

MR. STOUT:

With the continuation of that, your Honor,

16

may I be excused, or

—

17

. THE COURT:

18

MR. STOUT:

—

19

THE COURT:

No.

20

Yes.
do you want me to stick around for
No.

I'll take a look at it.

It's not

looking good for today, but (inaudible).

21

MR. STOUT:

Okay.

22

(Hearing concluded)

—

Thank you.
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Addendum D
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2009). Prohibited acts - Penalties
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (West Supp. 2009). Definitions
(1) As used in this chapter:
(ii) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control,
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation,
swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of
controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of
controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance,
it is not required that the person be shown to have individually possessed, used, or
controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of any
substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance
is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2009). Unlawful Acts
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound,
convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal,
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human
body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty7 of
a class B misdemeanor.
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined
As used in this chapter, "drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or
material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, repackage, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into
the human body in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, and
includes, but is not limited to:
(1) kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or
harvesting any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a
controlled substance can be derived;
(2) kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, converting,
producing, processing, or preparing a controlled substance;
(3) isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the potency of any
species of plant which is a controlled substance;
(4) testing equipment used, or intended for use, to identify or to analyze the strength,
effectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance;
(5) scales and balances used, or intended for use, in weighing or measuring a
controlled substance;
(6) diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannited,
dextrose and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled substance;
(7) separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove twigs, seeds, or
other impurities from marihuana;
(8) blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or intended for use
to compound a controlled substance;
(9) capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or intended for use to
package small quantities of a controlled substance;
(10) containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store or conceal a
controlled substance;
(11) hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to
parenterally inject a controlled substance into the human body; and
(12) objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body, including but not limited to :
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